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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to test whether the price paid for corporate 
takeovers in Europe is related to the synergies expected or whether bidders 
are overpaying for acquisitions. We analyzed the relationship between the 
premium paid in 147 mergers and acquisitions, and the bidders’ abnormal 
returns around the date of the transaction from 1995 to 2004. A quadratic 
relationship between the premiums and returns was found. When the amount 
paid in a transaction does not exceed the value of the target organization by 
more than 39.69–40.03%, the premium becomes a sign of the future synergy 
and will have a positive effect on the bidders’ returns. However, when the 
premium exceeds these values, the relationship between premiums and 
returns become negative and therefore the market considers bidders are 
overpaying. This paper show the importance of the correct valuation of the 
targets and of the premiums paid to ensure value creation in M&A.  
Keywords: Corporate takeovers; premium; overpayment hypothesis; 
synergy hypothesis. 
JEL Code: G34 
INTRODUCTION 
The Net Value Added of a M&A depends on the premium paid in the transaction, 
being it greater the higher the capacity of the bidder to complete the transaction at a price 
that is not greater than the expected cash flows. In this regard, different researchers (such as 
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Grullon et al., 1997; Mueller and Sirower, 2003; Moeller et 
al., 2005) have analyzed the effect of the premium paid in M&A (price offered above the 
market value of the target’s shares) on bidders’ and targets’ shareholders return1.  
In 2011, the activity of M&A in Europe increased 1.78% moving more than $51400 
million. The mean premium paid achieved a second record since 2002, 22%, only surpassed 
                                                     
1 As stated by Eckbo´s (2009) review paper of the premium literature, there is a growing research interest in 
the details of the takeover process from the initial bid through the final contest outcome. Succeeding with a 
takeover bid is difficult and involves strategies as the target may force the bidder to raise the offer price, reject 
all offers by the initial bidder in favor of a rival and even reject all bidders. 
* The views or opinions expressed in this manuscript are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 
the position, views or opinions of the editor(s), the editorial board or the publisher. 
+ Corresponding author Email: diazb@unican.es 
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by the premium in 2008 which was 23%. However, there have been transactions where the 
premium has been higher, such as the acquisition of Banco Pastor by Banco Popular (with a 
premium between 31% and 37%, considering the last quotation or the mean of quotations 
of the last weeks, respectively) or the acquisition of Bulgari by LVMH with a premium of 
60% over the quotation one day before the announcement.  This research will allow 
answering the question, “when the premium is considered too high?” which will be 
particularly useful for the market analysts, investors, regulators, and the scientific 
community in general.  
To answer this question, the research analyzed the relationship between premiums 
and bidders’ returns. Previous literature has considered a linear relationship between the 
premium and bidders’ returns. However no consensus has been achieved about whether this 
relationship is positive or negative (Bradley et al., 1983; Antoniou et al., 2008; Varaiya and 
Ferris, 1987; Sirower, 1997; Schwert, 2003). 
In this research, we expanded previous research by proposing a quadratic 
relationship between the premium and returns in corporate M&As, and subsequently, we 
empirically tested this relationship. The quadratic relationship allowed determining whether 
the bidders were overpaying in M&As or whether the premium paid in the deal was 
adequate to the synergies expected. The existence of this quadratic relationship allowed 
establishing whether or not the premium is considered too high and is negatively accepted 
by the market, producing a negative effect on the acquirers’ returns. 
A sample of 147 non-financial European M&As, from 1995 to 2004, was used to 
test the relationship between the premiums’ and bidders’ returns. First, the acquirers’ 
abnormal returns were estimated using event study methodology to later conduct a 
regression analysis on them.  
The results obtained from the event study showed negative and significant abnormal 
returns, although they were small for acquiring companies. On the other hand, in the 
regression analysis, a quadratic relationship was found between the premiums’ and 
acquirers’ returns. In fact, the results showed a positive influence of the premium on the 
returns until the premium was considered too high and the relationship became negative. 
Furthermore, in the sample used, a premium greater than 39.69–40.03% was considered to 
be too high by the market. 
In Section 2 of this paper, reviews on the existing literature regarding the value 
creation in M&As and the influence that the premium could have on it are presented. 
Section 3 describes the sample with which the empirical analysis was performed, and 
shows the main results obtained in the analysis. Finally, the main conclusions are outlined 
in the last section. 
CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REALTIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PREMIUMS AND BIDDERS’ RETURNS 
The development of this research is based on two questions: are there abnormal 
returns obtained by bidders on the announcement of corporate M&A? and, what are the 
main factors that explain abnormal returns? 
Regarding the first question, the results of previous research2 are not homogeneous 
and depend on the sector analyzed, the period of time considered, and the study’s target 
countries. Some authors find positive abnormal returns for bidders, while others observe 
negative or insignificant returns.   
                                                     
2 See Datta et al. (1992), Rhoades (1994), Bruner (2004), Campa and Hernando (2004) and Eckbo (2009) for 
a review of the previous research studies. 
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Regarding the second question, the literature has considered different variables to 
explain M&A abnormal returns. Some of these factors have been: diversification, be it 
geographically or by activity (Maquieira et al., 1998; Houston et al., 2001; Slangen, 2006); 
mean of payment, be it cash or stocks (Hansen, 1987; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003); size 
(Agrawal et al., 1992; Beitel et al., 2004); ownership structure (Bris, 2002; Akhigbe et al., 
2007); the consideration of the transaction as hostile (Gregory, 1997, Campa and Hernando, 
2004); the fact of having multiple bidders for the same target (Paliwal, 2007; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008); or buying a target that belongs to a regulated industry (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004).  
However, along with these variables, the premium paid has been also used to explain 
bidders abnormal returns in M&A (Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Porrini, 2006).   
Previous literature has shown the relationship between the premium and returns: 
Returns = ƒ(Premium, X1, ..., Xn) 
Where, X1, ..., Xn represents all the other variables that could affect the returns. 
Some studies showed that the premium positively influences the abnormal returns; 
whereas, other studies, on the contrary, found a negative relationship. However, a common 
characteristic of these studies was that they considered a lineal relationship between the 
premium and returns, according to the following equation: 
Returns = α + β1 Premiumi + Σ βn Xni +εi        Equation [1] 
The positive or negative influence of the premium over returns can be explained 
through one of the following hypotheses: the synergy hypothesis, which establishes a 
positive relationship between the premium and abnormal returns, or the overpayment 
hypothesis, which identifies a relationship in the other direction. 
The synergy hypothesis is based on the fact that the greater the synergies expected 
from the acquisition the greater the premium the bidder will be willing to pay. Therefore,   
merger premiums might proxy for the synergies expected between a bidder and its target, 
and a positive relationship between premium and return is expected (Bradley et al., 1983; 
Slusky and Caves, 1991) with β1 being positive in equation (1).  
Antoniou et al. (2008) empirically found evidence for this hypothesis, based on a 
sample of successful UK mergers in the industrial sector between 1985 and 2004. They 
observed that short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were positively correlated to 
the level of the premium paid by the acquirers.  
The overpayment hypothesis considers the payment of a premium that exceeds the 
synergies expected, increasing the likelihood of a value-destroying deal. Therefore, a 
negative relationship between the premiums and returns is expected. Sirower (1997), 
Grullon et al. (1997), Mueller and Sirower (2003), and Hayward and Hambrick (1997) 
observed a significant negative influence of the premium on the acquirers’ abnormal returns 
in the American M&As. In the banking industry, Díaz et al. (2009) also support the 
overpayment hypothesis when the premium is high3.  
The existing studies have justified the overpayment hypothesis using different 
arguments: 1) Hubris hypothesis based on overestimation of future profits (Roll, 1986); 2) 
The need to pay an excessively high price when several acquiring companies compete for 
the target - winner’s curse (Ruback, 1982); or 3) agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).   
                                                     
3 However the results obtained for the banking industry cannot be applied to the non-financial industry due to 
different regulatory restrictions. 
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Therefore, β1 would be negative in equation (1), because synergies are no longer 
considered as the reason for paying a specific premium, but overestimation of synergies 
(hubris hypothesis), winners’ curse, or agency problems. 
Finally, other studies failed to observe a significant relationship between the 
premium and returns in M&A, which could be explained by the joint effect of both the 
hypotheses4.  
Regarding those two hypotheses, Gupta et al. (2007) considered that merger 
premiums might be a proxy for either synergies or overpayment. They proposed that the 
relationship between premiums and returns is asymmetric, and depends whether the 
acquisitions is value-enhancing or value-reducing. They found that premiums negatively 
affect acquiring firms when the acquisition is classified as value-enhancing. However, they 
did not find any relationship between premiums and acquirers’ returns in value-reducing 
acquisitions. 
Like Gupta et al. (2007), we think the relationship between premiums and acquirers’ 
returns is asymmetric. However, different from them, we propose that this relationship 
depends on the magnitude of the premium in such a way that the premium would begin to 
have a positive influence on the abnormal returns of the bidder, thus, supporting the 
synergy hypothesis. However, if the premiums were too high, the effect would be negative, 
as indicated in the overpayment hypothesis. Therefore, a quadratic relationship between the 
premium and the acquiring company’s returns would be expected, and not a linear 
relationship, as has been suggested by previous corporate M&A literature.  
Thus, the equation proposed to relate premiums’ and acquirers’ abnormal returns can be 
given:  
Returns = α + β1 Premiumi +β2 Premium2i + Σ βn Xni +εi            Equation [2] 
where, the maximum 
of the premium is 
estimated as:  
According to our proposal, we expect a concave down relationship between the premiums’ 
and acquirers’ abnormal returns. Therefore, β1>0 and β2<0, thus: 
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In summary, this research allow to calculate the amount of premium paid in corporate 
M&A above which the market reflects there is overpayment.    
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data
The empirical analysis was performed for a sample of M&As undertaken among 
non-financial companies from Western Europe during the period of 1995–2004. The 
sources of information used in this study were: Thomson OneBanker, which provided 
                                                     
4 Moeller et al. (2005) analyzed the abnormal returns obtained in a sample of US-acquiring companies, 
showing no significant relationship between the premium paid and abnormal returns. The same result was 
observed by Cheng and Lung (2004) in 36 mergers among companies in Hong Kong during the period 1986–
1994 and by Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) in 115 M&As financed in cash.  
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information on the characteristics of M&A transactions; Datastream, which provided 
information on the companies’ daily stock quotes as well as profit and loss accounts and 
balance sheets of the companies. 
It is necessary to eliminate transactions in which the objective is purely financial 
and do not pursue objectives inherent to M&A, such as value maximization – through 
economies of scale, economies of scope and diversification – or the attainment of private 
benefits. The theory regarding M&A only justifies the significant abnormal returns in 
transactions that involve a change in control. Thus, researches that do not consider this fact 
within the sample could produce biased results in the analysis of the abnormal returns 
obtained with the transaction. 
Taking this into account, to identify appropriate transactions, the Thomson 
OneBanker database was used and the following criteria were applied:  
1. Both the acquirer and the acquired company must be listed on a European Stock 
Exchange (805 deals);  
2. The acquirer must go from possessing <50% to >50% of the acquired company5
(386 deals);  
3. As the objective consists of studying the premium, there must be information on the 
bid made (284 deals);  
4. The transactions in which there were insufficient data in the estimation period as 
well as in the event’s window were eliminated.  
By applying these criteria, a sample of 147 transactions was obtained, of which 50 
took place among companies in different countries and 67 took place among companies in 
different sectors. Table 1 shows the distribution of the transactions according to the country 
of the acquiring company and the year they were carried out. 
Insert Table 1 about here
To verify that the different filters applied in the sample’s composition do not affect 
its representativeness, we have included two columns in table 1 that show distribution of all 
companies by country and year in the initial sample and the final sample. As such, it could 
be observed that the analyzed sample followed a similar pattern regarding the 
representativeness of the countries included and years studied. 
Analysis of the Abnormal Returns 
This research used the standard methodology of the event study with daily returns to 
analyze the abnormal returns around a M&A announcement.  
To avoid bias when calculating the abnormal returns through the market model6, we 
used two alternative measures to obtain the expected return by applying variations of the 
original model. On one hand, the expected returns were calculated by applying the market 
model with an alpha equal to zero, and on the other hand, the specification Zero–One of the 
market model was used.    
                                                     
5 Beitel et al. (2004) considered only those operations that involved a change in the control and in which the 
acquiring company went on to hold over 50% after the transaction. 
6 This methodology is based on the calculation of abnormal returns (ARt), defined as the difference between 
the actual return (Rt) and the expected return (E[Rt]) calculated using the market model. ARt = Rt−E[Rt]. 
Expected returns were calculated using the market model for a period of 250 days, beginning 270 days prior 
to the announcement of the transaction and ending 21 days before. Event window to calculate abnormal 
returns was 41 days, between the 20 days before and after the announcement. 
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The research used the statistic based on standardized excess returns to test the null 
hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are equal to zero (Dodd and 
Warner, 1983). This allowed inference of whether the event analyzed had a significant 
impact on the market value of the companies that have announced a merger or acquisition 
transaction.  
The results obtained regarding the performance of the event study are included in 
Table 2. For each window, the table contains the average cumulative abnormal return 
(ACAR), the statistical significance test, and the percentage of firms that had negative 
CAR.  
Insert Table 2 about here
The results indicate the existence of abnormal negative returns on the days around 
the date of the announcement of the transaction. If we take any of the three proposals of the 
market model as a reference to calculate the abnormal returns, then a negative and 
statistically significant reaction is observed in the days around the event date. The window 
[-1; +1] shows a higher percentage of companies with negative abnormal returns, and this 
percentage >57% of the cases. Abnormal returns are found between 0.55 and 0.81% in this 
window, depending on the market model used as a reference. The use of different models 
allowed us to test the robustness of the results, showing that the statistically significant 
negative reaction is mainly concentrated in the days closest to the event date. Specifically, 
return is observed to be significant in all the models in windows [-1; 0], [0], [-1; +1], and [-
2; +2]. However, in the windows with a longer period of time, the results depended on the 
model taken as a reference. The windows [-2; 0] and [-5; +5] were significant for the 
market model with alpha equal to zero at 0.1%, while windows [-10; 0], [-5; 0], and [-10; 
+10] were also significant with the market model. Finally, there was no significant reaction 
in the wider windows, [-20; +20] and [-20; 0], in any of the models analyzed. 
Analysis of the Influence of the Premium on the Acquirer’s Abnormal Returns 
In addition to the event study, a regression analysis was performed to determine the 
existence of a quadratic relationship between the premiums’ and bidders’ returns. The 
dependent variable was the CAR obtained in the windows [-1; +1], [-2; +2], and [-5; +5].  
Evidence showed that the most significant market value changes occurred at the merger 
announcement date or on the day before the announcement. However, windows with a 
greater number of days were also used. These windows have been selected according to the 
results presented in Table 2. Window [-5; +5] is the longer length in which the abnormal 
returns are significant in most of the models. 
To empirically test the existence of non-linear relationship between the premiums 
and returns proposed in equation (2), we estimated the following model including several 
control variables:  
CARi = α + β1 PREMIUMi + β2 PREMIUM2i + β3 RSIZEi +β4 RSIZE2i  
+β5 RROAi +β6 CASHi +β7 DOMESTICi + β8 FRIENDLYi +β9 DIVERi  
+β10 MULTIBIDDERi +β11 REGULATEDi + Σ γ j COUNTRY DUMMIESji  
+Σ γk  SECTOR DUMMIESki+ Σ γm YEAR DUMMIESmi+ εi   
Equation [3] 
  
where, CAR refers to the cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring company for the [-1; 
+1], [-2;+2], and [-5;+5] windows around the announcement of the M&A. The independent 
variables are defined as follows: 
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PREMIUM is the ratio of bid price over the market price of the target organization, 
21 days before the announcement. The target market price 21 days prior to the initial 
merger announcement is used to avoid the influence derived from the announcement 
(Brewer et al., 2000; Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Antoniou et al., 2008). The 
empirical analysis introduced PREMIUM2 variable in equation (3) to test the quadratic 
relationship between the premium and abnormal returns of the acquiring company. It is 
expected that the premium starts by having a positive influence; however, when it reaches 
higher values, the influence becomes negative. This type of relationship would imply that 
the PREMIUM variable has a positive coefficient, and the PREMIUM2 variable has a 
negative coefficient. 
RELSIZE is measured by the ratio of the market value of the target over the market 
value of the acquirer plus the market value of the target, both 21 days prior to the 
announcement of the transaction. The reduction of the costs of the new organization is 
easier in the acquisition of smaller organizations. The greater the difference in the size, the 
greater is the probability that the acquiring company will improve the efficiency and 
profitability of the target through scale and scope economies offering new services and 
technologies (Agrawal et al., 1992; DeLong, 2001). In addition, greater size of the target 
organization makes the integration and the union of different cultures in a merger more 
difficult and expensive. Hence, either positive or negative relation is to be expected 
between this variable and the abnormal returns. The combination of the two previous 
effects might cause a quadratic relationship between the relative size and the abnormal 
returns of the acquirer. For this reason, we have also introduced the RELSIZE2 variable in 
equation (3).  
RELROA is the relative return on assets between the target company and the 
acquiring company. It is expected that a transaction will be more successful if the acquiring 
company is more profitable than the acquired company (Beitel et al., 2004; Louis, 2004), 
because the former can transfer their greater management abilities to the target organization 
and improve its efficiency. 
CASH is the percentage of the transaction financed with cash with a value ranging 
from 0 (transaction paid in stock) to 100% (Beitel et al., 2004). According to previous 
literature, better results can be expected for the stockholders of the acquiring company 
when the transaction is financed with cash instead of stock (Travlos, 1987; Kohers and 
Kohers, 2000), and therefore a positive relation between this variable and the abnormal 
returns is expected. Although several explanations have been given for this effect, the most 
widely used refers to informational asymmetries (Hansen, 1987).7  
DOMESTIC is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if it is a national 
transaction and 0 if it is an international one. Domestic M&As offer greater potential for 
obtaining synergies, whereas international M&As present regulatory or cultural barriers that 
reduce earnings (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Loree et al., 2000; Campa and Hernando, 
2004; Conklin, 2005). Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between domestic 
acquisitions and abnormal returns (Grullon et al., 1997; Beitel et al., 2004). 
FRIENDLY is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the merger was 
considered friendly by the board of the target firm, and 0 otherwise. The announcement of a 
hostile acquisition leads to higher returns for the acquirer than the announcement of a 
friendly M&A. This is because, in hostile transactions, there is a greater substitution of 
                                                     
7 Other alternative hypotheses focus on the fiscal differences between both the payment methods (e.g. Brown 
and Ryngaert, 1991), the financial synergies, and capital structure (e.g., Travlos, 1987) or the theory of free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986). See Eckbo (2009) for a revision. 
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executives within the acquired companies which, as a result, improves the management 
(Gregory, 1997; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Campa and Hernando, 2004). Therefore, a 
negative relation is expected between this variable and the bidders’ abnormal returns. 
DIVER is a dummy variable which assumes the value of 1 if the acquirer and the 
target main line of business is not in the same two-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. Several 
authors have found that M&As which lead to a diversification of activity tend to destroy the 
value for the acquiring companies (Maquieira et al., 1998; Houston et al., 2001; Flanagan 
and O’Shaughnessy, 2004).8 In contrast, those transactions which are concentrated in the 
same sector tend to be beneficial. This is owing to the fact that they offer a greater 
possibility of obtaining scale economies, replacing inefficient managers, reducing 
overinvestment, or increasing market power (Morck et al, 1990; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
DeLong, 2001). As such, a negative relation is to be expected between this variable and the 
bidders’ abnormal returns. 
MULTIBIDDER is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there are two or 
more bidders. It is expected that the competing bidders would be more attracted to a target 
when there are higher potential benefits from the takeover. However, the existence of 
multiple buyers increases the transaction’s cost for the company that finally makes the 
purchase. This is referred to in the literature as the “winner’s curse” (Fishman, 1989; 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Paliwal, 2007; Draper and Paudyal, 2008). Therefore, the 
expected relationship for this variable can be either positive or negative. 
REGULATED is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the industry of the 
target firm is an industry that is regulated.9 Campa and Hernando (2004) found that CAR 
are smaller for European M&As in regulated industries, which might hinder the success of 
M&As. 
Along with the previous variables, other variables were introduced to take into 
account the acquirer’s country, the sector to which the company belongs, and the year in 
which the transaction took place. Hence, to consider the country, the dummy variables were 
used. With regard to the distribution by sector, the companies were grouped into eight 
categories, following SIC codes, with the introduction of the dummy variables. Finally, the 
year in which the transactions occurred was controlled using time dummy variables. 
Table 3 shows a summary of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
Insert Table 3 about here
The table shows that on average, the price paid exceeded the price of the shares of 
the target company by 34%. It also shows that most of the transactions were settled in cash. 
In fact, only 52 of the 147 transactions analyzed were not fully paid for with cash (20 
transactions were undertaken by combining shares and cash, while 32 transactions were 
completely settled with shares from the acquiring company). It can also be noted that, on 
average, the target company has a lower ROA and is smaller in size than the acquiring 
company. In fact, the target company was larger in size in only 4 of the 147 transactions, 
with the difference in these cases being small in relative terms.  
                                                     
8 The lack of gains obtained in the formation of conglomerates could be related to the issue of diversification 
discount. Some studies have documented that diversified conglomerates appear to trade at a discount relative 
to matched portfolios of pure-play firms (Whited, 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Díaz et al, 2004). 
9 Following Campa and Hernando (2004), mineral industries, primary metal industries, transportation, 
communication, electricity, gas, and sanitary services were considered as regulated industries (2-digit SIC 
codes: 10, 13, 33, 40, 44, 45, 48, 49, 60, 61, and 80). 
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The results assuming a quadratic relationship between the premium and abnormal 
returns are presented in Table 4. Abnormal returns have been calculated for window 
[−1,+1] using both the market model as well as the market model with an alpha equal to 
zero, and the Zero–One market model. As it can be observed in models (a), the PREMIUM 
variable has a significant positive coefficient, and the PREMIUM2 variable presents a 
significant negative coefficient. This confirms the quadratic relationship between the 
premium, and therefore, this relationship may depend on the magnitude of the premium. 
The premium begins to have a positive influence on the abnormal returns of the acquiring 
company, supporting the synergy hypothesis. However, when the premium is too high, the 
effect becomes negative, as put forth in the overpayment hypothesis, giving rise to a non-
linear relationship.  
Insert Table 4 about here
By using the coefficients from Table 4, the maximum of the premium is between 
1.3969 and 1.4003, depending on the model considered10. Therefore, according to the 
results obtained from the sample of firms analyzed, when the amount paid in a transaction 
does not exceed the value of the target company by more than 39.69–40.03%, the premium 
would be a sign of future synergy and would have a positive effect on the returns of the 
bidders. However, if that threshold is surpassed, the acquirer’s shareholders suffer the 
negative effect of overpayment.   
Regarding the control variables, CASH variable, which measures the percentage of 
the transaction financed with cash, positively and significantly influences the abnormal 
returns for the stockholders of the acquiring company, such as expected.  
Moreover, the results also show that the relative size influences the acquirer’s 
abnormal returns through a quadratic relationship. The RELSIZE variable is not significant 
when introduced alone (models a). However, both variables (RELSIZE and RELSIZE2) are 
observed to be significant when they are introduced together (models b). Given that the 
RELSIZE coefficient is positive and the RELSIZE2 coefficient is negative, the relative size 
starts to have a positive influence on the abnormal returns owing to the economies of scale. 
However, as the size of the acquiring company increases, the integration problems increase 
and make the influence of this variable negative. According to our results, the turning point 
(maximum) in the relationship between the abnormal returns and relative size occurs when 
the acquired company has a size between 38.5 and 43% of the acquirer, depending on the 
model. 
The standardized coefficients presented between square brackets in table 4 show 
that the effect that the premium has on the bidders’ abnormal returns is more significant 
than the other variables referring to the deal or the firms’ own characteristics. 
To test the effect that the premium has on the abnormal returns, taking into account 
a greater number of days, the analysis for windows [-2; +2] and [-5; +5] was also carried 
out. Table 5 shows the results for window [-2; +2]. As it can be seen, the quadratic 
relationship between the premium and abnormal returns is maintained in all of the models 
considered. The PREMIUM variable continues to be significant and positive and the 
PREMIUM2, negative and significant. Table 6 shows the results for window [-5; +5]. In 
this window, the premium has no influence over the acquirer’s abnormal returns. In this 
case, it should be noted that the significance of the abnormal returns becomes lower as the 
                                                     
10 These values must be taken carefully, because the position of the turning point in the quadratic models is 
sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the model (Chen et al., 2004). 
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number of days included in the window increases (see Table 2). The results of window [-5; 
+5] could be owing to this fact. In any case, our results show an important effect of the 
premium on the abnormal returns in the windows in the shortest term. 
Insert Table 5 and 6 about here
CONCLUSIONS 
The main contributions of this research are the answers to the following questions: 
Is the price paid for corporate takeovers in Europe adequate to the synergies expected? Are 
the bidders overpaying for the acquisitions? This study enabled to determine that the 
answer to both the questions could be yes, but showed that it could depend on the 
magnitude of the premium paid in the M&A. Thus, the premium becomes relevant to 
predict the consequences of the deal on the bidders’ returns. 
Previous studies have considered a linear relationship between the premiums and 
returns. However, the influence of the premium on the returns might depend on the 
magnitude of the premium, and thus, a quadratic relationship between both the variables is 
proposed in this research.  
To test this relationship, the bidders’ abnormal returns were analyzed around the 
announcement of the M&A using the event study methodology. Subsequently, a regression 
analysis of the CAR obtained was performed to determine the importance of the premium 
therein. 
The event study results show the existence of abnormal negative returns for the 
bidders. In the regression analysis, a quadratic relationship between the premiums and 
returns was identified. The premium started to have a positive influence on the abnormal 
returns of the acquirer, according to the synergy hypothesis. However, when the premium 
was too high, the effect became negative, as established in the overpayment hypothesis. In 
conclusion, when the amount paid in a transaction does not exceed the value of the target 
organization by more than 39.69–40.03%, the premium becomes a sign of the future 
synergy and will have a positive effect on the bidders’ returns. Surpassing this threshold 
will have a negative influence on bidders’ returns.
This result makes necessary to reinforce the corporate control mechanisms of the 
companies to reduce the information asymmetries and agency problems to avoid the 
payment of a high price being exclusively made owing to the search for private gain by 
managers.  
Finally, the results obtained in the study revealed the need for further in-depth 
studies on the role that the premium plays in the results of M&As. In this research, the 
short-term returns of the bidders were focused; however, it would be interesting to analyze 
the behavior of the bidders who have overpaid in the long term. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Sample Composition  
Panel A. M&A classified by country Panel B. M&A classified by year 
Country Number 
of deals 
% final 
sample 
(147) 
% initial 
sample 
(805) 
Year Number 
of deals 
% final 
sample 
(147) 
% initial 
sample 
(805) 
Belgium 2 1.36% 2.86% 1995 3 2.04% 9.94%
Denmark 6 4.08% 2.98% 1996 6 4.08% 9.32%
Finland 3 2.04% 3.73% 1997 7 4.76% 10.31%
France 18 12.24% 18.39% 1998 12 8.16% 7.45%
Germany 12 8.16% 10.81% 1999 37 25.17% 19.25%
Greece 1 0.68% 1.86% 2000 33 22.45% 16.15%
Ireland-Rep 3 2.04% 1.99% 2001 22 14.97% 10.43%
Italy 3 2.04% 4.84% 2002 12 8.16% 7.70%
Netherlands 5 3.40% 3.85% 2003 11 7.48% 6.83%
Spain 15 10.20% 4.72% 2004 4 2.72% 2.61%
Sweden 8 5.44% 7.70% Total 147 100.00% 100.00%
Switzerland 6 4.08% 4.35%     
United Kingdom 65 44.22% 31.93%     
Total 147 100.00% 100.00%     
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